“Raisi’s visit to Syria was important from the standpoint of the future of Tehran-Damascus relations in the post-conflict period,” Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO and founder of [Persian] Gulf State Analytics, said in an exclusive interview with IRNA’s correspondent in New York.
“While Iran was important to Syria amid the crisis that erupted in 2011, Tehran wants to signal to Assad’s government that the Iranians remain committed to working closely with Damascus throughout the future,” Cafiero said.
He also argued that while some Arab states are trying to bring Syria back into their orbits of influence with the intention of halting Iran in Syria, Tehran’s message to regional actors is that the Islamic Republic will continue “investing in its alliance” with Damascus.
The following is the full text of the interview:
How do you evaluate the visit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Syria after 13 years since the beginning of the crisis in that country (Syria)?
President Raisi visited Syria at an important time. Throughout 2022 and 2023, President Bashar al-Assad’s government has been reintegrating into the Arab world’s diplomatic fold rather quickly. Some Arab states, including those which previously supported militias fighting Syria’s government, are now renormalizing relations with Damascus and sending their diplomats to Syria. Iran’s leadership sees this trend as an indicator of Tehran’s successes and Washington’s failures in Syria. The diplomatic agreement which Iran and Saudi Arabia signed in Beijing almost two months ago has done much to push Riyadh closer to fully renormalizing relations with Damascus. Tehran sees this movement toward Saudi-Syrian reconciliation as an extremely positive development with respect to Iran’s national interests and foreign policy agendas.
Raisi’s visit to Syria was important from the standpoint of the future of Tehran-Damascus relations in the post-conflict period. While Iran was important to Syria amid the crisis that erupted in 2011, Tehran wants to signal to Assad’s government that the Iranians remain committed to working closely with Damascus throughout the future. There were deals in the domains of energy, trade, railways, and agriculture which the two countries signed during the Iranian president’s visit to Syria, signaling Tehran’s desire to further deepen the bilateral relationship in the months and years ahead.
In your opinion, what is the impact of the Iranian president’s visit on future developments in the West Asian region, especially in Syria?
Iran has made it clear that it will remain actively committed to supporting the Damascus government and pursuing its national interests in Syria. Having made major sacrifices to bolster the Syrian government and help it stay in power amid the crisis, Iran wants to retain its high level of influence in the country throughout the future. While some Arab states are trying to bring Syria back into their orbits of influence with the intention of halting Iran in Syria, Tehran’s message to regional actors is that the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue investing in its alliance with Damascus.
Why do you think the US does not support the normalization of Syria’s relations with other countries and why is the Israeli regime, in addition to the US administration, upset with the Iranian president’s visit to Syria and the deepening of relationships between Tehran and Damascus while the US continues to maintain an illegal presence in Syria under the pretext of fighting terrorist groups and, according to the Syrian authorities, plundering Syria’s oil and energy resources?
The US would like regional actors to isolate Syria’s government and treat Assad like an illegitimate leader. Although Washington has essentially come to terms with the fact that the Syrian president is not on the verge of falling from power and probably won’t go anywhere any time soon, the US wants to prevent Damascus from reintegrating into the Arab region’s diplomatic fold. Neither the US nor Israel want to see a Ba’athist-ruled Syria become a strong regional actor like it was prior to the conflict’s eruption in 2011. Therefore, Washington is using its financial leverage and the power of sanctions to deter Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates from investing in or doing business with Syria. The Syrian state is weak and the country’s economy is in horrible shape, and my view is that US policies are designed to prevent either reality from changing too much down the road. Yet, a growing number of Arab states do not believe that giving Syria the ‘North Korea treatment’ will bode positively for the region and, therefore, questions about the Syrian government are likely to constitute a source of tension between the US and some of its Arab allies and partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, and Egypt.
At the request of the government of Bashar al-Assad and based on the principle of consultation with Russia and the Axis of Resistance, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been helping Syria so that terrorist groups cannot get hold of power in this country. How do you evaluate Iran’s role in the period of normalization of relations in the region and rebuilding in Syria?
The role that Iran played during the Syrian conflict will be different from the one which it will play in the post-conflict period. At this juncture, Assad’s government needs financial support and massive amounts of investment for Syria’s reconstruction and redevelopment. The West will not provide this because of political factors. Meanwhile, economic conditions in Iran and Russia will prevent either Tehran or Moscow from providing it. Therefore, the wealthy Arab states in the Persian Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the ones most likely to, at least eventually, make such investments in post-conflict Syria. For now, however, US sanctions are deterring them from doing so. But later circumstances might change. At a time in which Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are asserting their autonomy from Washington, it is not crazy to consider the possibility of these two Arab states disregarding the Caesar Act, especially if they sense that the Biden administration would be unwilling to enforce such secondary sanctions. At the end of the day, Iran would welcome Arab investment in Syria that helps the country rebuild because that would strengthen Tehran’s closest Arab ally.
In light of regional developments following the restoration of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, how do you assess the future of the process of the so-called Abraham Agreement? Will the Israeli regime be able to achieve its goals in the new West Asian region?
Maybe one day Saudi Arabia will formalize diplomatic relations with Israel. But under current circumstances, the Saudis joining the Abraham Accords is too difficult to imagine. With Israel making no concessions to the Palestinians, Riyadh is not willing to normalize with Tel Aviv. The extremist nature of Israel’s current government (even by Israeli standards) only makes it more unrealistic for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. According to my assessment, the process of expanding the Abraham Accords has frozen for now. In the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council, only two Arab states – the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain – have normalized with Israel. I don’t believe that another [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council member will follow suit, at least not in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, short of normalization, I think a handful of Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, will choose to cooperate with Israel in some relatively covert ways that do not require them to join the Abraham Accords. As Saudi Arabia moves ahead with its grandiose Vision 2030, Riyadh will likely value the ways in which Israel can contribute to the Kingdom’s economic diversification away from oil.
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